Abstract: In this article we introduce an input-oriented democratic innovation – that we term ‘TaxTrack’ – which offers individual taxpayers the means to engage with their political economies in three ways. After joining the TaxTrack program, an individual can: (1) see and understand how much, and what types, of taxes they have contributed, (2) see and understand how their tax contributions are, or have been, used, and (3) control what their tax contributions can, or cannot, be spent on. We explain (...) this democratic innovation in two ways. The first is through evocation to prefigure what the innovation could look like in future practise which raises the prospects for both good and problematic outcomes. The second is through formal theory to produce a detailed model of the innovation to assist theory building. We conclude by discussing three interactive outcomes of ‘TaxTrack’ through the democratic innovations literature to establish the beginnings of a theory for the model. This theory tells us that ‘TaxTrack’ can return benefits to its users and the democratic regimes in which they are located but it may also place restrictions on output-oriented innovations like Participatory Budgeting. (shrink)

The noisy computation hypothesis of developmental dyslexia (DD) is particularly appealing because it can explain deficits across a variety of domains, such as temporal, auditory, phonological, visual and attentional processes. A key prediction is that noisy computations lead to more variable and less stable word representations. A way to test this hypothesis is through repetition of words, that is, when there is noise in the system, the neural signature of repeated stimuli should be more variable. The hypothesis was tested in (...) an functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment with dyslexic and typical readers by repeating words twelve times. Variability measures were computed both at the behavioral and neural levels. At the behavioral level, we compared the standard deviation of reaction time distributions of repeated words. At the neural level, in addition to standard univariate analyses and measures of intra-item variability, we also used multivariate pattern analyses (representational similarity and classification) to find out whether there was evidence for noisier representations in dyslexic readers compared to typical readers. Results showed that there were no significant differences between the two groups in any of the analyses despite robust results within each group (i.e., high representational similarity between repeated words, good classification of words vs. non-words). In summary, there was no evidence in favor of the idea that dyslexic readers would have noisier neural representations than typical readers. (shrink)

A longitudinal perspective on motherhood that spans the experience of gestation, birthing, the care of young children, and the mother’s relation to her grown children makes way for a conception of the mother as essentially plural. It shall be argued in this paper that maternity is necessarily tied to surrogacy, that it is divided into a multiplicity of tasks inevitably parceled out to multiple agents. In this essay, the analysis of maternal surrogacy is focused on the phenomenon of mothering from (...) a distance, a maternal practice engendered by the feminization and globalization of labor markets. By both affirming the value of maternal surrogates and questioning the limits of surrogacy, this analysis of motherhood challenges both the economic exploitation that engenders and sustains distant mothering and the gendered division of care labor that supports the global economy of care. (shrink)

Flow is a gratifying state of deep involvement and absorption that individuals report when facing a challenging activity and they perceive adequate abilities to cope with it. The flow concept was introduced by Csikszentmihalyi in 1975, and interest in flow research is growing. However, to our best knowledge, no scoping review exists that takes a systematic look at studies on flow which were published between the years 2000 and 2016. Overall, 252 studies have been included in this review. Our review (...) provides a framework to cluster flow research, gives a systematic overview about existing studies and their findings, and provides an overview about implications for future research. The provided framework consists of three levels of flow research. In the first “Individual” level are the categories for personality, motivation, physiology, emotion, cognition, and behavior. The second “Contextual” level contains the categories for contextual and interindividual factors and the third “Cultural” level contains cultural factors that relate to flow. Using our framework, we systematically present the findings for each category. While flow research has made progress in understanding flow, in the future, more experimental and longitudinal studies are needed to gain deeper insights into the causal structure of flow and its antecedents and consequences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decision-Making as a Broader ConceptJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)KeywordsCompetence, decision-making, capacity, anorexia nervosa, autonomy, values, identityWe thank Demian Whiting for the thoughtful critique of aspects of our paper (Tan et al. 2006a). A primary aim of our research was to provide empirical grounds on which to stimulate discussion about the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC). Whiting criticizes in particular the concept of (...) 'pathological values' that we suggested might be relevant in the assessment of DMC and in the related issue of deciding when a patient's refusal of beneficial treatment should be overridden.Whiting's central concern is with DMC. Whiting argues that the absence of pathological values should not be a criterion for DMC. We are unclear whether he is also arguing that pathological values do not provide a reason of any kind for overriding treatment refusal. At the end of the paper he writes: "we cannot justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values... on the grounds that these patients lack DMC" (2009, XX). This seems to leave open the possibility that we may be able to justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values on grounds other than that they lack DMC. As we wrote in our response to the discussants of our original paper, "The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests" (Tan et al. 2006b, 300).In deciding on whether to use compulsory treatment, there are other relevant factors that may need to be considered, such as the seriousness of the decision, which determines the threshold for competence. However, in this response we consider three issues. First, we argue that the current concept of DMC is by no means so clear cut or generally agreed upon as Whiting implies, and that some of the lack of clarity relates to pathological values. Second, that the concept of DMC is itself dependent on accounts of autonomy, and that it is plausible that pathological values can affect autonomy. Third, we directly consider the question of whether a coherent account of pathological values might be given based on a concept of authenticity.The Current Criteria for DMCWhiting argues that the current criteria for DMC are correct and that an additional criterion along the lines of absence of pathological values should not be added. This argument assumes that there is a clear and agreed understanding of the current criteria. We believe this is not the case for three reasons.(i) Whiting begins his account of DMC by saying that it is normally taken to include: "(1) [End Page 345] understanding (and appreciation)" (2009, 341). Already there is an area of dispute, and the use of parentheses reflects this. The concept of 'appreciation' was developed by Grisso and Applebaum (Grisso, Appelbaum, and Hill-Fotouhi 1997). It is not included in either English common law development, for example (ReC), nor in the criteria specified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. More important, Grisso and Appelbaum in their comment on our original paper (2006) argue that our work advances thinking about 'appreciation' rather than requiring that we add new elements. The implication is that they believe that what we have called pathological values are relevant to the assessment of capacity and are already included in an account of capacity that incorporates the criterion of 'appreciation.' In our response, we argued that pathological values are not entirely captured within the account of appreciation that Grisso and Appelbaum had previously given. We do not want to revisit that issue here, but the point of relevance is that on one view (that of Grisso and Appelbaum) pathological values are already included in the current criteria for DMC as part of the concept of appreciation, whereas on Whiting's view they are not.(ii) Even if there were agreement over the wording and concepts relevant to DMC there is a further important issue: how are those concepts... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Studying Penguins to Understand BirdsJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), Ray Fitzpatrick (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)Keywordsanorexia nervosa, treatment decision-making, competence, valuesWe are grateful to Grisso, Appelbaum, Charland, and Vollmann for their thoughtful commentaries on our paper. We would like to respond by picking up on some of the points they make, although we do not address all the issues raised.Our general aims in the paper are (...) less immediately pragmatic than are the central concerns of Grisso and Appelbaum. Our interest is primarily in a number of ethical, and related conceptual, issues that arise from empirical data. In the long run, of course, we believe that these ethical and conceptual issues are important to the care of people with mental disorders, but our focus is philosophical.Our central interest is what justifies overriding treatment refusal. We are unhappy with a "status" approach according to which, for example, the mere fact that a person suffers a mental disorder provides grounds for overriding her wishes. Such an approach, it seems to us, fails to identify reasons, and discriminates against those with mental disorder, a view shared by the Law Commission (The Law Commission 1995). We are, on the other hand, attracted by the approach that grounds any overriding of treatment refusal on lack of capacity (or competence) to make treatment decisions. The concept of capacity has been well developed through legal cases and conceptual analysis, not least by Grisso and Appelbaum themselves. We were struck, however, first through clinical experience, and subsequently from the pilot study reported in our paper, that many patients with anorexia nervosa who refuse treatment do not necessarily lack capacity, using the current criteria, and yet show features or give reasons that raise serious doubts as to whether it is right to respect their refusal of treatment.To avoid reliance on a "status" approach, the issue with which we are grappling is whether the concept of capacity (and therefore lack of capacity) can be developed to encompass some of our findings, and whether it is ethically right to do so. Charland makes the important point that the concept of competence, or capacity, has both a descriptive and a prescriptive component. It is for this reason that the question of whether, for example, we should extend the criteria for capacity is part of the question of when it is morally right to override treatment refusal.Grisso and Appelbaum suggest that our work advances "our thinking about appreciation, rather than requiring that we add new elements" (2006, 297). From our perspective, and at this stage, it is a secondary issue whether we are suggesting a development of appreciation, or a new element (e.g., "pathological values"). The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in [End Page 299] such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests.We chose to study anorexia nervosa for various reasons, but we expect that the issues raised have a more general relevance (such as to substance abuse and impulse control disorders as Grisso and Appelbaum and Charland suggest). We do not expect the results to be relevant to all, or even most, mental disorders. Our main interest is not the specific management of people with anorexia, but how the data challenge, and help to develop, the concept of capacity, and the ethical analysis of overriding patient refusal of treatment. Our paper aims to address what we understand Charland to be referring to by the "pretheoretical desiderata" (2006, 283) of the concept of capacity. One reason why we chose anorexia as the focus of this work is because it is different from many mental disorders in the issues that it raises. In this it is, perhaps, rather like studying penguins to better understand the concept of bird just because penguins, although clearly birds, have unusual features.We agree, therefore, with Grisso and Appelbaum's caution that it would be unwise to jump in and change the MacCAT-T on the basis of the results... (shrink)

Regards inquiets est une somme de réflexions qui s'échelonnent sur de nombreuses années. Elles témoignent avant tout d'un souci de clarté sur ce qui se dit, se pense, se débat sur cette place publique mondiale que sont les médias, sans pourtant prétendre y mêler sa voix. L'auteur a vu naître l'écologie et a appris à la prendre au sérieux. Il a vu s'effondrer la superstructure religieuse de notre civilisation. Il continue à penser que rien ne pourra la remplacer, que la (...) paix des religions est une condition essentielle du développement du monde, et que la démocratie est source de trop d'illusions pour que l'on puisse en faire une manière de modèle platonicien, de validité planétaire. L'auteur a vu le pouvoir du virtuel menacer d'obsolescence le réel, qui pourtant permet encore de penser à un ordre créé, incontournable et incomparable. Il croit à des valeurs jugées obsolètes et ne craint de se faire juger de réactionnaire, car il admet qu'il n'y a de vrai progrès que là où de nouvelles forces sont puisées au fondement des choses. La lucidité critique est la lumière dans laquelle il a rédigé ces pages. (shrink)

"L'un des aspects les plus intrigants de l'œuvre de Michel Foucault réside dans son intérêt tardif pour la pensée antique, plus spécialement pour la culture grecque et son héritage romain qu'on peut faire remonter à ses recherches ayant mené, à partir de 1976, à son Histoire de la sexualité. Du fait même de l'infléchissement que connut alors sa pensée, Foucault fut à même d'établir des liens à tous égards originaux et même surprenants entre la pensée antique et la réflexion moderne. (...) En le lisant, c'est une tradition de près de 2500 ans qui s'offre désormais à notre regard. Que nous apprend, sur notre histoire, le fait de mettre en parallèle les propos de Socrate et ceux de Kant? À quoi peut servir l'interrogation menée sur la sexualité antique, si ce n'est peut-être à la « dépsychologiser », la « dépathologiser », la « détaxonomiser », et ainsi la « désenclaver » de ses classifications ultérieures? Que nous enseigne le fait d'entendre par « modernité » non plus une « époque » particulière de l'histoire, mais une manière d'être des individus, une certaine attitude adoptée, « ce que les Grecs, souligne Foucault, appelaient un ' éthos ' »? De quelle manière, finalement, l'esprit critique moderne s'éclaire-t-il de l'esprit critique antique? Les études ici rassemblées posent ces questions à Foucault, avec Foucault et parfois aussi contre Foucault, en écho toujours à ce « courage de la vérité » dont il incarna si splendidement l'exemple."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

Dans les traditions philosophiques occidentales, c'est à la critique développée par la pensée marxiste que l'on doit de pouvoir aborder l'oeuvre de Moses Hess (1812-1875). Pourtant, le "rabbin des communistes", comme on l'a appelé, fut l'un des penseurs du XIXe siècle qui questionna au plus près les conditions de la liberté et de l'égalité sociales, en même temps qu'il ouvrit la voie à l'idée d'un foyer juif en Palestine, où cette liberté et cette égalité se seraient pleinement épanouies. Dans les (...) études juives, la philosophie de Moses Hess est rarement évoquée, si l'on excepte quelques commentaires qui font de lui ce "communiste et sioniste, qui joua un rôle décisif dans le premier mouvement et inventa virtuellement le second". Le livre de Jean-Louis Bertocchi veut porter un éclairage nouveau sur cette oeuvre pionnière et singulière à bien des égards, dont le coeur est bel et bien la discussion serrée, "en accord divergeant", de la pensée de Spinoza, lu attentivement par Marx lui-même, et qui, dans le ciel d'un humanisme juif émancipé et émancipateur, dessine une constellation en perpétuel mouvement, où scintillent tour à tour philosophie, communisme et sionisme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Characterizing it as a "mythic discourse," Jean Baudrillard proceeds, in this brilliant essay, to dismantle the powerful, seductive figure of Michel Foucault. In 1976, Jean Baudrillard sent this essay to the French magazine Critique, where Michel Foucault was an editor. Foucault was asked to reply, but remained silent. Forget Foucault made Baudrillard instantly infamous in France. It was a devastating revisitation of Foucault's recent History of Sexuality—and of his entire oeuvre—and also an attack on those philosophers, like Gilles (...) Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who believed that desire could be revolutionary. In Baudrillard's eyes, desire and power were interchangeable, so desire had no place in Foucault's work. There is no better introduction to Baudrillard's polemical approach to culture than these pages, in which Baudrillard dares Foucault to meet the challenge of his own thought. This Semiotext edition of Forget Foucault is accompanied by a dialogue with Sylvère Lotringer, "Forget Baudrillard," a reevaluation by Baudrillard of his lesser-known early works as a post-Marxian thinker. Lotringer presses Baudrillard to explain how he arrived at his infamous extrapolationist theories from his roots in the nineteenth and early twentieth century social and anthropological works of Karl Marx, Marcel Mauss, and Emil Durkheim. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern PhilosophyJean-Robert ArmogatheRiccardo Pozzo, editor. The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004. Pp. xvi + 336. Cloth, $69.95.The status of a "great" philosopher is to stand out for centuries, asking questions in such a way that the answers can never be definitive. Not so many of them are able to stand such a severe (...) proof. Aristotle phrased some questions we are still groping to answer. It was a very good idea to ask thirteen scholars to deliver a lecture series at the Catholic University of America during the Fall 1999 about the reception of Aristotle's theory of intellectual virtues (Nich. Ethics VI). The speakers did not stick to this issue, and enlarged their purpose to a general approach of Aristotle's receptions in various moments of Western modern philosophy.Edward Mahoney complements Charles Schmitt's basic introduction to Aristotle and the Renaissance, with some very valuable pages about Cardinal Bessarion's contribution to the Byzantine debate aroused in 1439 by Plethon's comparison between Plato and Aristotle (in favor of the former). Along with Charles Schmitt, Antonino Poppi is the best specialist of the Paduan tradition, and wrote a very qualified paper about Zabarella (1533-89), who shaped Aristotelianism into the rigorous science of the schoolbooks: for centuries, Aristotle is read through Zabarella's glasses. Apart from a bird's view on recent Galilean studies (where Alistair Crombie is not mentioned), William A. Wallace makes his point about Aristotle's influence on Galilean logics, linking Galileo's 1640 letter to Liceti (where he states that, in matters of logic, he has been an Aristotelian all his life) to the scientist's deep knowledge as revealed by the logical questions in one of the juvenile treatises (ms 27 in Florence, more thoroughly studied in Wallace's book, Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof [Dordrecht, 1992]). John Doyle, a specialist of Late Scholastic Philosophy, figures out a [End Page 209] strange character, the French Jesuit André Semery (1630-1717), who taught for thirty years at the Collegium romanum. In a very anti-Aristotelian way, he holds a definite belief in metaphysical beings of reason. The boundary between what we can think and say is quietly stepped over, when Semery and other Jesuits begin to think about thinking, opening a very modern path which leads to Brentano and Quine. Christia Mercer states that Leibniz's combination of a Platonist epistemology with an Aristotelian conception of nature brings a very innovative view in ethics. A very forceful paper by Richard L. Velkley compares Rousseau's politics to Aristotle's view of man (the paper became a chapter of his 2002 impressive book Being after Rousseau), while Riccardo Pozzo gives a short presentation of Aristotle's reception in modern Germany, and an elaborate analysis of Kant's debt to Aristotle for the intellectual virtues. Hegel's appropriation of Aristotelian intellect is presented by Alfredo Ferrarin, while Michael Davis reconstructs Nietzsche's path from Aristotle to the tragedy and back, in a very convincing way. Husserl (Richard Cobb-Stevens), Heidegger (Stanley Rosen), Wittgenstein (Daniel Dahlstrom) and Gadamer (Enrico Berti) conclude brilliantly the series, showing how the thought of the Stagirite fertilized contemporary philosophers, in a permanent dialogue of disagreement or borrowing, never at rest, and never leaving anyone indifferent. The old Greek man remains a vivid debater for our age of anxiety.Jean-Robert ArmogatheThe University of Paris-SorbonneCopyright © 2005 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

In 1982-83, I was preparing my volume on the Belgian cartoonist Hergé. During the Second World War, Hergé’s comic strips appeared daily in the newspaper Le Soir. Since I wanted to analyze the influence of the rightist thought on Hergé and Tintin, I borrowed most of the copies of Le Soir available in this country through interlibrary loan. Examining the newspaper, I came across Paul de Man’s articles, which were sometimes on the same page as the comic strips. I (...) showed these articles to some colleagues related to or teaching at Harvard University. I specifically recall an afternoon with a colleague from Boston University whose specialty is the hunting of presumed French fascist intellectuals; we discussed together the possible bridges between de Man’s contemporary thought and his former intellectual engagement during the Second World War.That is to say that, as far as I know, several people at Harvard and in the Boston area were aware of de Man’s former affiliation with rightist circles. One can ask why it took five more years for the “scandal” to appear: why this “sudden” revelation after several years of silence and dissimulation? Compared to the fact that Hergé had constantly been confronted with his political past, one can wonder how strongly Paul de Man’s “secret” was kept. Jean-Marie Apostolidès is professor of French at Stanford University. He is currently writing an essay on the anthropological reading of literature. His article “Molière and the Sociology of Exchange” appeared in the Spring 1988 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 5, Page 18-20, May 2012.

One of the most perceptive and ambidextrous social commentators of our day, Augustinian scholar Jean Bethke Elshtain furnishes in ever fresh ways through her writings a bridge between the ancient and the modern, between politics and ethics, between timeless moral wisdom and cultural sensitivity. To read Elshtain seriously is to take the study of culture as well as the "permanent things" seriously. But Elshtain is no mere moralist. Neither is she content solely to dwell in the domain of the (...) theoretical. For it is Elshtain the citizen - the creatively engaged and contributing citizen - whom the reader encounters on virtually every page of her writings. But reader beware: Elshtain does not shy away from controversy. At the same time, she is anything but a controversialist. In the essay that follows, several prominent themes that emerge from Elstain's writings - civic responsibility, justice, gender, and war - are considered afresh. Whether one agrees with her positions or not, one is forced to confess in the end that she cares deeply about the common good. And this alone makes her required reading for any engaged citizen of the republic. (shrink)

Nous tentons dans cet article de proposer une thèse cohérente concernant la formation de la notion d’involution dans le Brouillon Project de Desargues. Pour cela, nous donnons une analyse détaillée des dix premières pages dudit Brouillon, comprenant les développements de cas particuliers qui aident à comprendre l’intention de Desargues. Nous mettons cette analyse en regard de la lecture qu’en fait Jean de Beaugrand et que l’on trouve dans les Advis Charitables.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Of Diversities and Comparisons...Sor-hoon TanEncyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Antonio S. Cua. New York and London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. 1,020.Encyclopedias can be useful in teaching philosophy when students need some reading that sets out the basics on a key topic in a few pages without their getting lost in too many complex details or being misled by oversimplifications. They can also be edifying for the philosophy teacher and (...) scholar—providing reliable, up-to-date information on topics that lie in their field but that are not part of their working knowledge. For these reasons, those working in Chinese philosophy will welcome the publication of the Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy. The 187 entries cover a variety of subject areas such as "Moral Philosophy" and "Philosophy of language"; Confucianism in different periods and countries, Daoism, Mohism, Legalism, the school of names, Buddhism, and Marxism in China; philosophical trends in post-Mao China, Taiwan, and overseas; key concepts such as dao (the way), fa (law, standards), liyi fenshu (principle and manifestations), and quanli (rights); texts such as the Huainanzi and the Wenzi; and thinkers from Laozi and Confucius to Hu Shih and Mou Zongsan.Instead of more numerous short entries, this encyclopedia has opted for fewer entries of greater length—the Preface tells us that entries on important thinkers and philosophical topics typically range from five thousand to nine thousand words in length, and a quick check reveals that even the shortest entry is at least two pages long (more than one thousand words). This format allows authors to explore the philosophical issues at some depth, and expound even complex arguments in detail. The connections between different concepts, thinkers, texts, philosophical theories, and development that stretch across different periods and territories can be delineated more clearly in a single entry. There is a danger of duplication with this format, as some texts and concepts may be covered in several articles; for example, most of "Confucianism: Constructs of Classical Thought" is on what the author identifies as six key texts of Classical Confucianism: the Analects, Mencius, Xunzi, Yizhuan, Zhongyong (Doctrine of the mean), and Daxue (Great Learning). The sections on Mencius and Xunzi (pp. 66-67) merely introduce a small part of what is discussed in much greater depth and detail in the entries on these two thinkers (pp. 440-448 and 821-829). The Zhongyong and Daxue also have their own entries, and "Confucianism: Confucius" (p. 61) contains an entire section on the Analects.As it turns out, the duplication is less than expected. Pei-jung Fu, author of "Confucianism: Constructs of Classical Thought," implicitly questions Xunzi's Confucian pedigree, beginning his discussion with "Xunzi professed to be an advocate of Confucianism" (p. 67). Such doubt is clearly not shared by A. S. Cua, who authored [End Page 111] the entry on "Xunzi," introducing the thinker as "an important exponent of classical Confucianism" (p. 821). Cua also does not share Fu's view that "the real issue between Mencius and Xunzi lies in their concepts of heaven (tian)" (p. 67). Fu and the author of the entry on the Zhongyong translate key terms in the texts differently: Fu discusses "five ethical codes" and "three comprehensive virtues" (p. 68) while Yanming An calls them "five universal paths" and "three universal virtues" (p. 890). Such differences can be either thought provoking or confusing (especially when unaccompanied by Chinese characters or even pinyin), depending on the reader. The sections on the Analects in "Confucianism: Confucius" and "Confucianism: Constructs of Classical Thought" have hardly anything in common; the first examines it as an account of how Confucius lives as an exemplar remembered by his students, while the latter discusses its content, focusing on ren and li, as well as on Confucius' religious concerns. While concepts such as ren and li are frequently discussed, the different ways in which authors employ them and the different characteristics, contexts, and philosophical stakes they pay attention to enrich one's understanding of the many dimensions of these concepts even as similarities in diverse entries reinforce certain aspects and perspectives.One comes across disagreements to various degrees on common or related topics among different entries. While... (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 244-253, October 2022. This article is a précis of my 2019 monograph The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality. The book engages with a growing trend of philosophical thinking according to which the felt dimension and the intentionality of emotion are unified. While sympathetic to the general approach, I argue for a reconceptualization of the form of intentionality that emotional feelings are widely thought to possess and, accordingly, of the kind (...) of role they play in our mental lives. More specifically, I argue that the way we feel in having an emotion is not a perception-like awareness of evaluative properties of its object, but instead constitutes the taking of a stand or position on this object in light of its evaluative properties. (shrink)